Currently working on a diagonalization argument against the decidability of the Hard Problem based on the Halting Problem argument.
Each observer likely operates on a Bayesian over the statistics of quantum microstates—like, this much is obvious from that being how more ordinary thermodynamics works, and this is information thermodynamics.
For a maximal version of acquiring every consciousness-relevant state, you’d have to have total access to the subject’s light cone, which can only be achieved by being the subject (or seamlessly becoming the subject, if we’re allowing one causality hack); either way, you need a new, causally forbidden method to exfiltrate a complete accounting of information.
The Halting Problem analogy as such (well, a little Liar’s Paradox too): considering only tests by any exterior means, one could construct a test subject who intentionally distorts the secondhand representation of their qualia but is identical by every other test.
Now, for a hint as to where I take this as a positive proposal: I propose that reality is neither observer-invariant (true physicalism and/or deterministic QM interpretations) nor strictly observer-dependent (idealism and/or Everett), but observer-intersubjective.
Currently working on a diagonalization argument against the decidability of the Hard Problem based on the Halting Problem argument.
Each observer likely operates on a Bayesian over the statistics of quantum microstates—like, this much is obvious from that being how more ordinary thermodynamics works, and this is information thermodynamics.
For a maximal version of acquiring every consciousness-relevant state, you’d have to have total access to the subject’s light cone, which can only be achieved by being the subject (or seamlessly becoming the subject, if we’re allowing one causality hack); either way, you need a new, causally forbidden method to exfiltrate a complete accounting of information.
The Halting Problem analogy as such (well, a little Liar’s Paradox too): considering only tests by any exterior means, one could construct a test subject who intentionally distorts the secondhand representation of their qualia but is identical by every other test.
Now, for a hint as to where I take this as a positive proposal: I propose that reality is neither observer-invariant (true physicalism and/or deterministic QM interpretations) nor strictly observer-dependent (idealism and/or Everett), but observer-intersubjective.
More on this to come. For now, thoughts?